Presidential candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump enter Election Day and facing tight battles in the swing states.

Millions of people have already voted early, but the remainder of Americans will cast their votes on Tuesday. Before the results start rolling in, UW News asked three 天美影视传媒 professors of political science to discuss what鈥檚 on their minds heading into the general election鈥檚 final hours.

, professor of political science

I’m looking at two specific predictions. The first is whether one candidate has (more or less) a clean sweep of the swing states or whether they (more or less) tie and divide the electoral college votes from the swing states. The swing state polling is effectively tied, suggesting that the latter scenario is more likely. But what if the polling is systematically overestimating or underestimating one candidate鈥檚 popularity? I suspect this is the case, and that either Harris or Trump will sweep the swing states.

If I’m right, the second prediction involves: Which candidate will sweep? I suspect it is more likely that Harris would be the candidate to sweep over Trump. There is a lot of different types of evidence out there showing the polls are likely underestimating her support or over-estimating Trump’s. There is no evidence to suggest that the polls are underestimating Trump’s support or overestimating hers 鈥� but of course, they could be, and this is all reading tea leaves. I wouldn’t be that surprised if the swing states are more divided, and there is still the possibility that Trump could sweep them.

We will get lots of vote counts in by Tuesday night from Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia, which will help us to see some trends.

, professor of political science

Like everybody else who feeds on the听IV drip known as the presidential election’s horse race coverage, I will be monitoring Pennsylvania 鈥� the swingiest of swing states.

I will be looking for any evidence that Trump’s attempts to mobilize young men without college degrees by blitzing non-traditional media such as podcasts and securing endorsements from figures like Elon Musk made a big impact. I will also be watching to see whether turnout on the Republican side is influenced by President Biden’s off-the-cuff remarks about Trump’s supporters being garbage, whether he intended to say that or not.

I will also be looking for any evidence that Vice President Harris’s efforts to mobilize women around abortion and reproductive rights and against Trump’s misogynistic听language and behavior made a huge impact. Similarly, whether her overtures to suburban Republican women and Independents听with the aid of surrogates like Liz Cheney helped her cause.

There are other hypotheses that are up for testing:

Is the great re-sorting of the parties along educational lines 鈥� and cutting across other cleavages such as race, ethnicity and region 鈥� the big thing some analysts think it is? Will immigration really drive voters to the polls, particularly to vote for Trump in large听numbers?

Will voters’ memory of 20% cumulative inflation since 2021, sky-high housing prices and relatively high interest rates be as salient as some analysts believe? Or will more recent trends of enduring economic strength and a soft landing stop the momentum toward Trump on the economy?

Finally, if Harris wins, is it because she executed an incredibly difficult feat with exceeding discipline? Did she successfully manage to reinvent her image in a few short months, credibly transforming into a centrist security hawk who prizes unity and bipartisanship despite significant听baggage from her 2019 Democratic presidential primary flameout? In other words, was she able to shed her image as a hyper-progressive Bay Area liberal and come across as a unifier who appeals to folks across the political spectrum? If she wins, I am going to be looking for data that supports this thesis, because it will say a lot about American politics and the parties going forward.

, teaching professor of political science

This election presents difficult circumstances for the Democratic Party. In other elections across western democracies, incumbent governments have been defeated badly by voters angry about inflation and the other dislocations of the pandemic. The American election being a coin flip suggests that some different issues might be in play in the American context.

搁别肠别苍迟,听suggesting that Iowa 鈥� a state Trump easily carried in 2016 and 2020 鈥� is close because of a major shift among women voters. This suggests that the overturning of Roe v. Wade because of former President Trump’s three nominations to the Supreme Court is making the election more competitive.

The decision of Iowa Republicans to pass a near-total abortion ban in a pro-choice state is the obvious explanation, and the abortion issue is one obvious reason that the outcome of the听election is so uncertain.

For more information or to reach one of the faculty members, contact Lauren Kirschman at lkirsc@uw.edu.

stole the name of his new class 鈥� an irony that isn鈥檛 lost on him, considering the subject matter.

The name of the course, 鈥�,鈥� is a nod to 鈥�,鈥� a book that analyzes the methods the world鈥檚 despots use to stay in power. It鈥檚 required reading for the class, which Long designed and is teaching for the first time this quarter at the 天美影视传媒.

鈥淚 want to set up for students why democracy is worth stealing and why it鈥檚 worth it for some leaders to try to cheat in an election,鈥� said Long, a professor of political science. 鈥淚t鈥檚 because the value for the people that win is so high and important. There are more elections today around the world than there have been at any point in human history, and yet there are still all these persistent threats to realizing the democratic gains from those elections. When they鈥檙e undermined or rigged, elections can make democracy a lot worse.鈥�

The course, which has no prerequisites and is open to any student at the UW, also highlights the types of politicians who try to steal elections, and how and what can be done to secure them. While Long took inspiration for the course鈥檚 name from the book and similar titles used by colleagues who have studied election fraud in the past, he swapped the word 鈥渞ig鈥� with a word invoked more often today in the United States.

鈥溾�� was a rallying cry for supporters of former president Donald Trump on January 6, 2021, when a violent mob stormed the U.S. Capitol to try to prevent Congress from certifying the election outcome. Trump has also tried to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the 2024 election, claiming that the only way he could lose is if his opponents cheat.

A from The Washington Post/University of Maryland found that 62% of U.S. adults believe President Joe Biden was legitimately elected in 2020, down from 69% in 2021. Just 31% of Republicans believe the election was legitimate.

But when it comes to election interference in the United States, Long said, reality doesn鈥檛 match Trump鈥檚 claims. Long pointed to the between Trump and Hillary Clinton, which was influenced in ways Long said the U.S. wasn鈥檛 prepared for, or even aware of at the time.

鈥淲e don鈥檛 have direct evidence that the vote totals were changed, but we do know there was Russian influence into states鈥� election management systems, as well as disinformation spread online seeking to sow chaos and confusion for voters,鈥� Long said. 鈥淒id that swing the election? We don’t know the answer to that. We know it was a close election. We know that it was targeted to persuade voters to move in the direction of Trump.鈥�

As for 2020, Long called it 鈥渢he most secure election in U.S. history鈥� because intelligence agencies worked to fix exposed weaknesses, particularly at the state level.

鈥淒epending on your political perspective, you might think it鈥檚 the other way around 鈥� that 2016 was free and fair and 2020 was the one that was rigged,鈥� Long said. 鈥淏ut there鈥檚 no evidence that anything ran afoul in 2020. There are persistent threats, and they may become salient during certain election periods. U.S. elections are very secure in many ways, and we鈥檝e learned from the past, but there are all sorts of threats that remain.鈥�

One of those threats is the targeting of candidates, as evidenced by two recent attempts to assassinate Trump. While political violence isn鈥檛 new in the U.S. 鈥� past examples include the assassinations of Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King. Jr, as well as the shooting of Ronald Reagan 鈥� it鈥檚 been decades since tensions ran this high.

Long said these threats have come from Trump himself, who joked in 2016 about somebody assassinating Hillary Clinton, encouraged brawls at his rallies and has already impugned the integrity of the vote by refusing to confirm that he will concede if he loses in November.

鈥淭his doesn’t mean we won’t have a secure election, but it does mean that threats to election integrity certainly persist in the U.S.,鈥� Long said. 鈥淔or somebody like Trump to not only occupy the office of the presidency and commit alleged crimes for which he鈥檚 been indicted, but who also wants to occupy the office again to avoid that legal liability, that is something that a lot of countries have faced and puts the U.S. in kind of a global perspective.鈥�

Long has been working on issues of election fraud since the , which was marred by allegations of rigging. A doctoral student at the time, Long was observing his first election outside the U.S. He went on to create a class on global crime and corruption, but realized there was an opportunity for a second course focused on election fraud specifically.

Among other topics, Long鈥檚 newest class will cover the , which international monitors called neither free nor fair as Nicol谩s Maduro, the incumbent, controlled most institutions and repressed political opposition.

The problems that arose in Venezuela reminded Long of issues he saw in Kenya, which he then worked with colleagues to overcome during elections . The class will explore these kinds of connections between elections.

鈥淚 knew I wanted to teach this course during a U.S. election because I wanted it to be a U.S.-global perspective,鈥� Long said. 鈥淚t would be an American classroom with Americans and non-Americans there, but people would be thinking about the world together rather than just the United States. There are a lot of different historical and contemporary cases to discuss. There really are a lot of different ways to steal an election.鈥�

For more information, contact James Long at jdlong@uw.edu.

天美影视传媒 political scientists and have spoken and written extensively about politics in emerging democracies and 鈥� usually those other than the United States 鈥� check the power of their leaders, present and past.

Former President Donald Trump鈥檚 recent indictment poses existential challenges for an otherwise mature democracy like the United States: What are citizens willing to accept from their presidents, even once they鈥檙e out of office?

Menaldo and Long, both faculty in the UW Department of Political Science and co-founders of the , talked with UW News about how they frame these issues not only for the media and the general public, but also for their students. The conversation was edited for clarity.

听

Q: Watergate and President Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon have come up often in discussions of the Trump case. Does it make sense to compare them?

James Long: Regardless of what you think of Ford’s pardon, Nixon paid a price for his misdeeds: He had to resign and left office in disgrace, even if he was not then criminally prosecuted. At this point, Trump has not yet faced accountability, assuming he’s guilty at all, and in fact he could be rewarded through reelection, which was never possible for Nixon.

Then there鈥檚 a broader point on how you want to treat presidents when they’re in office or after. Pundits and lawyers say every citizen is equal under the eyes of the law. That may be true in principle, but at the same time a president is not like everybody else 鈥� they have certain duties to uphold. That doesn鈥檛 mean presidents should commit corrupt or criminal acts, but it does mean that they perform a different function than all other citizens.

We’ve put members of Congress, governors, city council members and all manner of politicians in jail. When people have been really concerned about a president’s actions and their legality, we have basically decided as a country, until now, that it’s not worth it: Reagan and George H.W. Bush on Iran-Contra; Bill Clinton and 鈥淟ewinsky-gate鈥�; George W. Bush for conduct in the war on terror. If what you care about is moving on, then you excuse the misdeeds, even possible crimes. You just hope that the person retires and you try to move on. The problem with Trump is that he wants to be president again.

Bad behavior on the part of previous presidents — when it鈥檚 been known 鈥� folks have decided to let it go in some broad sense. Now that’s changing. I think we’ve set a new precedent with Trump, and we have no idea what that means in the future.

听

Q: You鈥檝e written about other countries鈥� experiences, including those that have prosecuted leaders aggressively and those that have avoided it for various reasons. What are the issues that arise?

Victor Menaldo: Presidents are political animals by nature. They are called on to do things that are always potentially at the margin of illegality, especially around foreign policy, because in Jack Nicholson鈥檚 famous words: 鈥淎mericans simply can鈥檛 handle the truth.鈥� If you put presidents under a microscope, you will always find some basis for some kind of accusation.

So in response, there are two extremes: One is to put the microscope away and look the other way. The problem there is you incentivize bad behavior and end up with impunity. The second is to always use that microscope and magnify every little thing they do and encourage prosecutors to go after them with abandon. But if there鈥檚 an investigation every single time there is even the smallest iota of wrongdoing, then that’s going to create perverse consequences: A president will anticipate it, so they’re going to use their power to ward off prosecution or to stay in office so that they don’t see the jailhouse.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is a good example. He was once a staunch defender of the judicial branch in Israel 鈥� a rather vanilla type of conservative. But when he started to get in legal trouble, especially in 2019 when he was sitting prime minister and indicted for fraud and bribery, he became more of a populist who attacked the other branches of government. He tried to get his supporters to help him legally by delegitimizing Israel’s democratic institutions, especially courts. In fact, he’s trying to do that now that he’s returned to power, and he鈥檚 mastered how to peddle conspiracy theories and radicalize and polarize the country to try to take the legal heat off.

The U.S. might start to look more like an Israel, Peru or Brazil, where it’s politically difficult not to go after leaders, and so both political parties may magnify that microscope and hyper-scrutinize everything leaders do. Then leaders may be tempted, like Netanyahu and Trump toward the end of his time in office, to undermine institutions and laws that threaten their freedom. This has been a recipe for eroding democracy, such as in Bolivia during Evo Morales鈥� presidency.

Q: How do you incorporate Trump in your teaching?

VM: Trump鈥檚 case has allowed me to focus on two tools democracy provides to uphold the rule of law and make sure politicians behave well. One involves how you sanction them and the other involves the leaders you select in the first place. The latter is usually more powerful because if democracy is constructed well, you’ll select the right type of leaders who don’t want to misbehave, whose strategy is to please the people in ways that are legal, and that strive to improve life for the majority of citizens, to leave the country better than they found it.

I think Trump showcases the failure of this screening tool. It’s not about electing angels but about selecting politicians who at least want to do right, even if it’s for self-interested reasons, such as improving their popularity or burnishing their legacy. It鈥檚 about rejecting leaders who aren’t going to press every advantage, look for every opportunity to politicize the law or cripple their opponents, or undermine institutions, to gain short-run advantages.

We have taken for granted in this country how much we rely on the screening tool so we can avoid turning to the sanctioning one. If you select bad leaders, then you are in trouble, because prosecutors may be beholden to them or, if they are not, a politician鈥檚 supporters are going to try to discredit attempts to hold them accountable. Good screening therefore beats imperfect punishment, and Trump makes it easier to teach this lesson.

JL: The interesting thing to teach about Trump to undergrads in my current class on global crime and corruption is not only about Trump, but about the American presidency: the two things that the framers of the Constitution thought about and in part, but only in part, gave us solutions to.

The framers were mindful of the fact that you can’t just take whatever criminal statute you have and always apply that to the president. You have to allow the president broader powers, and you also have to allow the fact that they may do something that’s not technically illegal but which is unbecoming of the office of the presidency and undermines their constitutional discharge. Therefore they should be removed from office in a way that is different than how a person may be thrown in jail if found guilty of a crime. So they wrote 鈥渉igh crimes and misdemeanors鈥� in the constitution as an impeachable offense, which any impeachment article would have to define.

Secondly, they gave Congress this duty. They understood the balance of power would constrain the executive. They saw what Oliver Cromwell had done in the brief period when England didn鈥檛 have a monarch and they had their own revolution against King George. So they were fearful of a lawless executive and so part of Congress’ job is to limit presidential abuse of office.

But something the framers worried about but didn鈥檛 have a great solution to was how to avoid partisan interests in Congress that could undermine its impeachment powers. If people care more about being Democrats and Republicans than they do about asserting Congress鈥� role to stop an unruly president, or avoid overzealous and frivolous investigations, then the fact that this is Congress’ Constitutional prerogative doesn’t matter.

One thing the framers wouldn鈥檛 have anticipated is that the executive branch has essentially declared itself above the law. During the Nixon Administration, the Justice Department鈥檚 Office of Legal Counsel’s decision said that no sitting president can be criminally charged. This was upheld during the Clinton administration and formed the basis of Robert Mueller鈥檚 鈥渄eclination鈥� to prosecute Trump. To be clear, this is the executive branch, under the DOJ, providing legal and political cover to the head of that branch, the president, to do whatever they want. That鈥檚 the standard that we have right now 鈥� although the OLC opinion has not been tested in court, it throws the matter of a lawless president back to Congress.

Although Nixon never went through the impeachment process, it’s well documented that he resigned when Republican senators came to him and said he would not have the votes to survive conviction; and what about congressional Democrats and Republicans during Clinton鈥檚 impeachment and Senate trial, and both of Trump鈥檚? Are these all examples of Congress performing the function the framers invested them with, shirking responsibility or something else entirely?

For my students, thinking about dilemmas the framers considered and the solutions they provided, but also how in various ways those solutions have been perhaps undermined, is profoundly fascinating and interesting.

Radnitz is an associate professor in the Jackson School of International Studies. His book, “,” was published this month by Oxford University Press. His first book,听, was published by Cornell University Press in 2010.

“Revealing Schemes” explores “causes, consequences and contradictions” from a collection of 1,500 conspiracy claims from a dozen countries in the post-Soviet region from 1995 to 2014, as well as national surveys and focus groups.

“My book looks at how politicians use conspiracy theories,” Radnitz said. “While people tend to associate the use of conspiratorial rhetoric with dictators 鈥� who seek to dominate, distract or otherwise manipulate their citizens 鈥� one of my main findings is that conspiracy theories (or claims, more precisely) emerge in the course of political competition.

“In other words, they come in handy to rulers whose power is in some doubt, rather than those who enjoy unrivaled control. I argue that incumbent leaders deploy conspiracy claims to send signals about their knowledge and power, and to pre-empt future threats.

“For this reason, rulers also frame as conspiracies certain kinds of events that threaten their power: mass protests, challenges to sovereignty, or militant or terrorist violence 鈥� all of which are visible and palpable challenges to authority.”

UW News: Who believes conspiracy theories, and why?

S.R.: In the U.S. and other Western countries, conspiracy theories are popularly believed 鈥� according to some studies, by half the population. Yet they did not enter into mainstream politics 鈥� until recently 鈥� for two reasons: first, these democracies developed together with, and thanks to, civil society watchdogs and knowledge-producing institutions that held politicians in check.

And second, conspiracy theories have long had a pejorative connotation, such that politicians who endorsed them would be stigmatized and not taken seriously. It鈥檚 evident now that neither condition holds as they once did.

Independent institutions are coming under attack by illiberal forces within democracies, making it easier to get away with political lies and disinformation. And certain politicians 鈥� and here, I don鈥檛 think I need to mention a particular master of the craft 鈥� thrive on conspiracy theories. Such rhetoric is not only not shunned by their followers; instead it is rewarded electorally and used to amass power and money.

Needless to say, this development should concern citizens who value the quality of democracy and prefer leaders who are accountable and responsive to their needs.

There are news reports that Russia, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia all have recently pushed QAnon narratives as part of disinformation campaigns aimed at the United States. Is this a new phenomenon? What are their goals?听

S.R.: The conspiracy theories thriving in the United States just now, mostly on the political right, are highly politicized and vicious. Once people are as divided and vulnerable as we are, it鈥檚 easy for political opportunists, whether here or abroad, to play their hand at exacerbating anger and distrust.

For countries seeking to advance their geopolitical interests, different kinds of propaganda work at different times. For example, during the Cold War, the U.S. government sought to advertise the American way of life as a way to turn people in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe against their governments, which was highly effective.

Today, stoking distrust in American elections, or making people afraid of getting vaccinated, or more generally, encouraging Americans to hate each other, appears to be an effective tactic for U.S. adversaries, and it’s cheap and easy to do through social media.

But it’s important to keep in mind that as much Russia or Iran has sought to degrade American political discourse, it is Americans themselves who bear the brunt of responsibility for this dismal state of affairs. And it鈥檚 here that the problem needs to be fixed.

For more information, contact Radnitz at srad@uw.edu.

听

has observed many elections in Asia and Africa, for research and as part of an advocacy organization called . An associate professor of political science at the 天美影视传媒, Long has the kind of election fraud that most Americans have not: ballot-stuffing, forged polling place counts, and blatant intimidation of voters and harassment of election workers.

But now, with President Trump decrying mail-in voting and suggesting he may not agree to a peaceful transition of power if he loses the election 鈥� as he did in the first presidential debate 鈥� Americans are worrying about how the election will be conducted, and what will happen no matter who the winner is, said Long.

So this fall, Long launched a focused on election security, 鈥溾��, featuring experts from the UW and elsewhere, and building on the audience of the . Newly recorded episodes focus on mail-in voting and President Trump’s recent COVID-19 diagnosis; other topics scheduled before the general election include foreign interference, the role of social media, and resolving disputed elections. Future topics depend somewhat on what happens Nov. 3, Long said. He鈥檚 considering a continued focus on domestic issues, for example, or an exploration of elections around the world.

鈥淭his is the first election in my lifetime where Americans are talking about administration and certification of the election in the same way we do when we observe elections in developing countries,鈥� he said. 鈥淚 believe it鈥檚 my duty as a citizen to provide a platform to Americans for what the international community has learned over the years.鈥�

UW News spoke with Long about the podcast, the issues raised and this particular time in American politics.

What do you see playing out in U.S. elections that reminds you of your experiences abroad?

The U.S. is distinct from other countries in that it doesn鈥檛 have a single election; it has 50 separate elections that occur on the same day. So there are 50 different state laws around how they do registrations, and how they administer elections. In other countries, elections are administered by one body, for the whole country.

But the way that the U.S. is similar to other countries is how its elections are vulnerable to hacking, and to the weaponization of information. This has gone on in other countries for years 鈥� and during the Cold War, the United States did that with elections in Latin America and Europe, to make sure communists or leftists weren鈥檛 elected. But the 2016 election was the first time Americans were really made aware of it here.

Today, the threats are not just coming from outside, or one candidate here or there, they鈥檙e coming from the incumbent government. That鈥檚 what we see in authoritarian countries, where leaders then claim fraud if they lose or threaten violence. This is the first time in the U.S. where I鈥檝e seen a president make allegations that are completely unfounded about the election鈥檚 integrity to this extent, which is part of the justification for this podcast.

How did Bush v. Gore set the stage for what we see today?

One thing that was confirmed by Bush v. Gore was that there are certain election challenges at the state level, and since then, there have been some efforts in Congress, and among some states, around voting, voter registration and ballot-counting to improve the process. One conclusion I鈥檝e come to is that some states will innovate in ways to increase voter access and protect systems, and some won鈥檛.

Bush v. Gore made us aware of the vulnerability of elections, but it taught us the wrong lesson, which is that any disputed election can easily be resolved by the Supreme Court and therefore provide a legitimate winner.

The results of Bush v. Gore came down to the ballot count in one state, Florida, and whether the state was capable of adjudicating the recount. Remember, that recount was halted due to riots outside one of the counting centers where Gore was pulling ahead; it was litigated up to the Supreme Court, which faced a deadline in the seating of the state鈥檚 electors and sent it to them to decide the outcome.听 Florida, where Jeb Bush, was governor, had already certified George W. Bush as the winner before the recount.

So it wasn鈥檛 the exercise of the law as such with the Supreme Court but rather the exercise of raw political power, with the riots shutting down the recount, that determined the winner.

These days, election security, itself, is a political issue. Why is that dangerous?

We鈥檝e known there鈥檚 been 50 different state systems for a long time, and there have been other issues that have threatened the credibility of elections: voter suppression, gerrymandering and campaign finance. There are decades of legislation and court cases around these issues, such as Citizens United, and states can draw congressional boundaries around districts that affect voter turnout. The U.S. has dealt with those in ways some may not have liked or agreed with, but it was part of the legislative and judicial process.

What we鈥檙e not used to is people openly breaking the law or illegally and directly manipulating the vote count, or the weaponization of electoral integrity itself. The very act of voting and how ballots should be counted has become politicized, and in a one-sided way. This is the first time that many Americans are having to confront new information about what constitutes a secure ballot, what foreign interference is, and what are legal and illegal ways to count ballots. It requires an enormous amount of education for Americans; they鈥檙e learning what Afghans and Kenyans, for example, have been aware of for a long time.

With the benefit of your research, do you believe the U.S. will be able to overcome these challenges?

There are certain things that are probably not going to happen easily, like eliminating entirely the weaponization of information on social media. Social media platforms are private companies; they鈥檙e not media houses and aren鈥檛 beholden to journalistic ethics. At the end of the day, you can post wrong information, and people may or may not believe you. That being said, after the debacle of 2016, we must credit Facebook, Twitter and other platforms for more aggressively responding to fake accounts and misinformation in this campaign cycle. Problems remain, but progress is being made.

Now, with foreign interference, there鈥檚 a lot the U.S. can do, and a lot the Obama administration did do in 2016 when they became aware of what was happening with Russian infiltration of state election systems. State governments can work to improve their own systems (and many have since 2016). The federal government can also provide technical and financial support to protect systems so that someone from the outside can鈥檛 hack into them to change vote counts.

States can also learn from each other. Every time I鈥檝e gone to an event that鈥檚 focused on U.S. elections, it鈥檚 all about how states are innovating and sharing those findings with other states. Colorado, California, Oregon and Washington are frequently mentioned as innovative states around mail-in voting, improvements in same-day voter registration, or motor-voter registrations, for example. In Washington, you effectively have a receipt to your mail-in ballot with a unique bar code that allows you to prove your ballot has been counted and means the system can鈥檛 be flooded by fake ballots under your name.

The problem is if one political party or both political parties don鈥檛 have an interest in securing the vote or engage in discussions on electoral integrity in good faith, then that will continue to be a challenge. It鈥檚 what we are seeing already in many states ahead of this election. You have to have all the players on board agree to sit back and let the voters and election administrators do their jobs, and certify winners. I fear that鈥檚 not where things are at in the U.S. right now.